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Abstract-Recently, Batabyal [l] has shown that when the decision to get married in an arranged 
marriage is analyzed in an intertemporal and stochastic setting, it is possible that a marrying agent 
will never get married. This result arises because the marrying agent in [l] maximizes the probability 
of accepting the best possible marriage proposal. What happens when a marrying agent uses the 
following decision rule: Get married as long as the quality of a marriage proposal exceeds a stochastic 
reservation quality level? In this note, we provide an interesting answer to this question. First, we 
show that the probability of getting married with this decision rule is always positive. Even so, we 
point out that on average, an agent who uses this decision rule will end up single. @ 2003 Elsevier 
Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Arranged marriages are predicated on the supposition that because of a variety of reasons such 
as imperfect and incomplete information (2, p. 2101, and the tendency of young people to seek 
pleasure [3, p. 1761, young persons generally cannot be relied upon to find an apposite spouse for 
themselves.’ Therefore, parents, relatives, friends, and increasingly, matchmaking intermediaries 
(hereafter, well-wishers) take upon themselves the task of looking for a suitable bride or groom. 
Whereas, in western societies, the agent wishing to marry generally looks for a spouse himself or 
herself, in an arranged marriage this crucial task is generally not undertaken by the agent but by 
his or her well-wishers.2 The reader should note that this is a basic difference between arranged 
marriages and marriages in western countries. 
The second pertinent feature of arranged marriages concerns the marrying agent’s decision. 
As Blood [6, p. 551, Rao and Rso [9, pp. 32-331, and Applbaum [lo] have noted, in modern 
arranged marriage settings, the agent wishing to marry has considerable autonomy over the actual 
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marriage decision. In the words of Blood [6, p. 111, while well-wishers look for suitable marriage 
prospects, the agent is “given an explicit opportunity to veto the nominee before negotiations 
are pursued.” ‘This agent receives marriage proposals as a result of the exploratory activities 
(newspaper advertisements, phone calls, conversations with acquaintances) undertaken by his or 
her well-wishers.’ The marrying agent’s problem is to decide 
(i) what kind of decision rule to use, and 
(ii) which marriage proposal to say yes to. 
Even though arranged marriages have been around for quite some time, economists have been 
interested in systematically studying marriages only since Becker [ll]. Further, this interest has 
almost completely been confined to the study of marriages in western societies in a deterministic 
setting. As a result, even though the decision to get married in an arranged marriage has 
everything to do with decision making under uncertainty, we know very little about the stochastic 
properties of alternate decision rules in arranged marriages. Recently, Batabyal [1,12,13] has 
analyzed stochastic models of decision making in arranged marriages. Using the so-called one 
stage look ahead policy (OSLAP), Batabyal [i2] shows that a marrying agent’s optimal decision 
rule depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there 
is recall of previous proposals. In [13], decision making in arranged marriages with an explicit 
age constraint is studied. In this setting, Batabyal [13] shows that it is optimal to wait a while 
before saying yes to a marriage proposal. The fact that it is optimal to wait a while is consistent 
with the “value of waiting to invest” result in the investment under uncertainty literature.For 
more on this literature, see [14]. 
The Batabyal [l] paper is the closest to our note. In this paper, the “When do I say yes to a 
marriage proposal” question is answered by analyzing the decision problem faced by a marrying 
agent who wishes to maximize “the probability of accepting the best possible marriage proposal, 
when these proposals are received sequentially” [l, p. 440, italics in original]. In particular, it is 
shown that it may be optimal for the marrying agent to never say yes to a proposal, i.e., to never 
get married. The reader should note that this result has nothing to do with the marrying agent’s 
time (and decision making) horizon. Rather, it arises because the marrying agent’s optimization 
problem involves the maximization of a probability. 
What happens when a marrying agent uses the following decision rule: Get married as long as 
the quality of a marriage proposal exceeds a stochastic reservation .quality level? The objective 
of this note is to answer this hitherto unstudied question. As we shall see, in an intertemporal 
and stochastic setting, a rather interesting result arises and that result is this: The probability of 
getting married with this decision rule is always positive. In other words, the likelihood of saying 
yes to a proposal is always positive. However, in an expected waiting time sense, our marrying 
agent will have to wait an infinite amount of time before (s)he gets married. The remainder 
of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical 
framework and the results. Section 3 concludes and offers suggestions for future research. 
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider an individual who wishes to get married in an arranged marriage. In what follows, 
we shall refer to this individual as our marrying agent. As a result of the investigative activities 
of this marrying agent’s well-wishers, marriage proposals are brought to him or her sequentially 
in accordance with some independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic process. In 
other words, a marriage proposal of some quality is received in time period t with a certain 
probability, independent of preceding or subsequent proposals. These proposals are received over 
time, one proposal per time period. 
Looked at along the time dimension, the decision problem faced by our marrying agent concerns 
when (if ever) to say yes to a proposal. Alternately, looked at along the proposal dimension, this 
agent’s decision problem concerns which proposal (if any) to say yes to. Following Batabyal [l], 
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we now make two assumptions. First, we suppose that the decision to say yes to a marriage 
proposal is binding in the sense that a previously rejected proposal cannot be recalled at a 
subsequent point in time.3 Second, we suppose that a decision to say yes to a marriage proposal 
is irreversible. In other words, the possibility of divorce is disallowed and we are analyzing the 
marriage decision as a once in a lifetime decision. 4 The marrying agent solves his or her decision 
problem in an intertemporal and stochastic setting. 
Upon receipt of a proposal, our marrying agent must decide whether to say yes to the proposal 
(get married) or to decline the proposal (stay unmarried) and wait for further proposals. If 
the marrying agent accepts a proposal, i.e., if (s)he says yes to marriage, then the question of 
subsequent proposals is redundant. Therefore, the stochastic marriage proposal receipt process 
terminates. We now need to specify a decision rule for our marrying agent. A simple decision 
rule--and the one that we analyze in this not-is the following. Let Me, Mr, I&, Ma,. . . be 
i.i.d., nonnegative random variables that denote the quality of the marriage proposals that are 
received sequentially over time. In other words, Me is the quality of the first marriage proposal, 
Mr is the quality of the second marriage proposal, and so on and so forth. We suppose that 
our marrying agent’s (stochastic) reservation quality level is MO, the quality of the first marriage 
proposal. Then, our marrying agent’s decision rule is to accept the first proposal that exceeds Ms 
in quality. 
Prom the perspective of our marrying agent, the situation described in the previous two para- 
graphs involves acting in a sequential decision making framework. To this end, denote the com- 
mon and the continuous distribution and the density functions of the random Mc, Ml, Mg, MS,. . . 
marriage proposals by G(.) and g(.), respectively. Now, given our marrying agent’s decision rule 
(see the previous paragraph), .let N be the first index i for which A4i > MO. In other words, 
N = 1 if Ml > MO, N = 2 if Ml 5 MO and M2 > MO, and so on. In words, N is an index for 
the first proposal whose quality level exceeds the reservation quality level MO. As an example, 
if N = 30, then looked at in terms of the waiting period, our marrying agent has to wait twenty- 
nine time periods-recall that a proposal is received every time period-before (s)he says yes to 
a marriage proposal. Looked at in terms of the number of rejected proposals, our marrying agent 
turns down twenty-nine proposals and then says yes to the thirtieth marriage proposal. 
Now, to comprehend the nature of the arranged marriage decision in the setting of this note, 
let us first compute the probability mass function Prob{N = n} for the positive and integer 
valued random variable N. The computation of this probability mass function is facilitated by 
noting that Prob{N = n} = Prob{N > n - 1) - Prob{N > n}. Now, Prob{N > n} = Prob{& 
is the largest among (MO,. . . , M,,)} = l/(n + 1) b ecause each random variable Mj, j = 0, . . . , n, 
has the same chance of being the largest. More formally, we have 
Prob{N > n} = 
I 
m[l - G(m)lng(m) dm = - 
s 
m[l - G(m)lnd[l - G(m)]. (1) 
0 0 
Now substitute z = [l - G(m)] in the right most integral in equation (1). This gives 
s 
1 




Using equation (2) we can infer that 
1 
Prob{N = n} = Prob{N > n - 1) - Prob{N > n} = i - & = -. 
n(n + 1) (3) 
3What happens when previously rejected proposals can be recalled is discussed in [12]. 
4By making this assumption, we wish to capture the fact that in most societies in which arranged marriages are 
customary, social pressures are such that once the agent agrees to a marriage proposal, it is typically diiTicult for 
him or her to renege on the original decision, at least in the short run. 
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Equation (3) gives us the probability mass function for the random variable N. Looking at 
equation (3), we see four interesting characteristics of the arranged marriage decision. First, for 
any finite N, the probability of saying yes to a marriage proposal (getting married) is always 
positive. Second, the maximal likelihood of getting married is l/2 and this probability occurs 
when N = 1. Third, as N rises, the probability of getting married falls over time. Finally, in the 
limit as N + 00, the likelihood of getting married is zero. Together, these four characteristics 
tell us that the likelihood of getting married is higher early in the marrying agent’s time and 
decision making horizon. This finding is consistent with reality. As noted in [6,13,15], ceteris 
paribus, it is more difficult for an older agent to get married via the arranged marriage route. 
So far we have seen that, for all practical purposes, i.e., for all finite N, the probability of 
getting married is positive. However;what is the expected wait before our marrying agent is able 
to say yes to a proposal? Speciiically, given the limiting result of the previous paragraph, is it 
possible that in an expected waiting time sense our marrying agent will never get married? To 
answer these questions, we now compute the mathematical expectation of N, E[N]. Because N 
is a nonnegative and integer valued random variable, we can use equation (2) and equation (5.2) 
in [16, p. 4415 to compute its expectation. We get 
TX=CO ?I=00 n=CO 
E[N] = c Prob{N 2 n} = c Prob{N > n} = c -!- = 00. 
n=l n=O n=O n+ l 
Equation (4) answers the two questions posed in the previous paragraph. Specifically, we see 
that even though the probability of getting married for all finite N is positive, the expected wait 
until marriage is infinity. Therefore, in an expected waiting time sense, our marrying agent will 
never say yes to a marriage proposal (always stay unmarried). 
Batabyal [l] showed that when a marrying agent maximizes the probability of accepting the 
best marriage proposal, it is possible that (s)he will never say yes to a proposal (never get 
married). Our equation (4) result complements the Batabyal [l] finding. In particular, this 
result tells us that even when a marrying agent’s focus is not on maximizing the probability of 
accepting the best marriage proposal, the use of the decision rule described in this note along 
with the stochastic reservation quality level can still tilt-in an expected waiting time sense-a 
marrying agent’s decision in the direction of no arranged marriage. Further, the analysis of this 
note tells us that the decision rule analyzed here is suboptimal in the sense that on average, a 
marrying agent following this rule will end up single. 
Does the equation (4) result hold when our marrying agent’s reservation quality level is de- 
terministic and not stochastic? Our ongoing research on this subject tells us that the answer to 
this question is no. In other words, when the reservation quality level is fixed, the expected wait 
until marriage is finite. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In this note, we analyzed the arranged marriage decision in an intertemporal and stochastic 
framework. We used this framework to answer a previously unstudied question. What happens 
when a marrying agent uses the following decision rule: Get married as long as the quality of a 
marriage proposal exceeds a stochastic reservation quality level? Our analysis showed that for 
all finite N, the likelihood of getting married is always positive. Even so, in an expected waiting 
time sense, our marrying agent will have to wait infinitely long before (s)he is married. It is in 
this sense that our marrying agent ends up never getting married. 
The analysis of this note can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we 
suggest two possible extensions. First, instead of working with an i.i.d. stochastic process, one 
5This equation provides a compact formula for computing upper tail probabilities of nonnegative and integer 
valued random variables. 
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could analyze the decision to get married in an arranged marriage in a setting in which the 
stochastic proposal receipt process exhibits serial correlation over time. Second, if the marrying 
agent learns about the statistical properties of the proposal receipt process, then it is possible 
that this agent will ultimately know the distribution from which the proposals are received. One 
could study the effects of this knowledge on the “Which proposal to say yes to” question. Studies 
that analyze these aspects of the problem will provide additional insights into the criteria that 
govern the decision to get married in an arranged marriage. 
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